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Abstract—Along with the development of vehicular sensors and
wireless communication technology, Internet of Vehicles (IoV)
is emerging that can improve traffic efficiency and provide
a comfortable driving environment. However, there is still a
challenge how to ensure the survivability of IoV. Fortunately, this
goal can be achieved by quickly verifying real-time monitoring
data to avoid network failure. Aggregate signature is an efficient
approach to realize quick data verification quickly. In this
paper, we propose a monitoring data batch verification scheme
based on an improved certificateless aggregate signature for
IoV, named MDBV. The size of aggregated verification message
is remain roughly constant even as the increasing number of
vehicles in MDBV. Additionally, MDBV is proved to be secure
in the random oracle model assuming the intractability of the
computational Diffie-Hellman problem. In consideration of the
network survivability and performance, the proposed MDBV can
decrease the computation overhead and is more suitable for IoV.
Index Terms—Internet of Vehicles, Survivability, Batch Verifi-
cation, Aggregate Signature, Big data.
I. INTRODUCTION
TODAY, the development of wireless networks (such asWiMAX, ad hoc, and sensor networks) has attracted
worldwide attention by providing more convenient commu-
nication services. As an emerging paradigm, Internet of Ve-
hicles (IoV) [1] is evolving from Vehicular Ad hoc Net-
works (VANETs). It merges vehicles, infrastructure, human
and networks to an intelligent unit that is more efficient
compared with VANETs. Moreover, IoV adopts different kinds
of technologies (e.g. self-organization, deep learning and cloud
computing) to improve the network survivability and reliabil-
ity.
In recent years, lots of works [2], [3], [4], [5], [6], [7],
[8], [9], [10], [11], [12], [13], [14] have been proposed to
the reliability, flexibility, survivability, and security of wireless
networks. To better understand IoV, many researchers have
This work is supported in part by the Key Program of NSFC-Tongyong
Union Foundation under Grant U1636209, Joint Fund of Ministry of Educa-
tion of China (No.6141A02022338), the 111 Project (B08038) and Collabo-
rative Innovation Center of Information Sensing and Understanding at Xidian
University.
Jingwei Liu, Qingqing Li, Huijuan Cao, and Rong Sun are with the
School of Telecommunications Engineering, Xidian University, Xi’an 710071,
China. (e-mail: jwliu@mail.xidian.edu.cn; 15229259171@163.com; caohui-
juan345@163.com; rsun@mail.xidian.edu.cn)
Xiaojiang Du is with the Department of Computer and Informa-
tion Sciences, Temple University, Philadelphia, PA 19122, USA. (e-mail:
dxj@ieee.org)
Mohsen Guizani is with the Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering, University of Idaho, Moscow, ID 83844, USA. (e-mail:
mguizani@ieee.org)
'DWD$EVWUDFWLRQ
(Aggregation & Access)
'DWD$FFXPXODWLRQ
(Storage)
$SSOLFDWLRQ
(Reporting, Analytics, Control) ,R9
&ORXG6HUYHU
99
'DWD&HQWHU
9395,96
&ROODERUDWLRQ	3URFHVVHV
(Involving People & Business Processes)
9LUWXDO1HWZRUN2SHUDWRU
(Policy enforcement & Flow-based management)
&RQQHFWLYLW\
(Pre-processing unit & Communication)
'DWD$FTXLVLWLRQ
7UDIILF&RQWURO
&HQWHU (+HDOWK
Fig. 1: Seven-level reference model
raised several reference models: the three-level model [15],
the four-level model [16], and the five-level model [17]. Com-
bining the merits of these models, we propose a comprehensive
model for IoV, as shown in Fig. 1.
Nowadays, IoV is playing an important role in smart city.
It has made the traffic more efficient [18]. Nevertheless, for
the intrinsic features of IoV, it has to face lots of challenges
about the network survivability. Security and performance are
two key factors of affecting the network survivability. When
an malicious attacker uploads wrong information such as fake
accident message, it may cause traffic control center to make
incorrect decisions. So it is important to verify all of the up-
loaded data to enhance the survivability of IoV. However, the
burden of collecting the monitoring data from different sources
(such as vehicles sensors, infrastructures, smart terminals, and
so on) may increase with vehicles, and affect the transmission
efficiency. In order to enhance the network survivability and
prevent the data from being falsified, the protection and verifi-
cation mechanisms should be considered [19], [20]. Aggregate
Signature (AS) is a suitable cryptographic primitive to batch
verify big data in IoV scenarios, because it can merge n
signatures on n different messages into a single short signature.
Thereby, it is deployed in MDBV to improve the survivability
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and performance of IoV.
In 2003, Boneh et al. proposed the first AS scheme [21].
Following the original work, many aggregate schemes over
different public key cryptosystems have been proposed. These
schemes are widely used in vehicular communications, mobile
networks, and other resource-constrained scenarios [22].
The main contribution of our paper is summarized as
follows:
• A CLAS-based monitoring data batch verification scheme
with lower computation and communication overhead is
proposed to enhance the survivability of IoV scenarios.
• A state information is introduced for vehicles to join or
leave the system dynamically. Once knowing the state in-
formation, vehicles can generate their data authentication
information independently.
• The security properties of MDBV are proved in de-
tail, assuming the hardness of the CDH problem, even
though the super adversary launches the adaptive-chosen-
message attack and adaptive-chosen-identity attack.
• The performance evaluation indicates that MDBV
achieves the less overhead in the phase of individual
monitoring data signing and batch verification among
these selected schemes, which is more compatible and
preferred by vehicles and the data center respectively.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces the related work about aggregate signature. Some
preliminaries are briefly introduced, involving bilinear pairing
and security model in section III. In section IV, the proposed
scheme MDBV is described in detail. Then, we analyze the
security of MDBV in section V. The next section evaluates the
performance of MDBV. Conclusion of this paper is drawn in
section VII.
II. RELATED WORK
Cheon et al. [23] proposed the first ID-based AS scheme
in 2004. In 2007, Gong et al. [24] introduced a certificateless
aggregate signature to solve the key escrow problem of ID-
PKC. They constructed two specific schemes using bilinear
mapping that can resist to two types of attackers. Nevertheless,
the size of the aggregated signature was related to user number.
Since the merits of CL-PKC, soon afterwards, many CL-AS
schemes [25], [26], [27], [28], [29], [30], [31], [32] were
proposed. In [25], the authors designed an efficient CL-AS
scheme that required short group elements in aggregation
phase and constant pairing operations in batch verification
phase, whereas it cannot achieve unforgeability. Though the
size of the aggregated signature was independent of the
number of signers, the scheme in [26] required the participants
to negotiate a new status information to generate an individual
signature every time. In [27], the scheme was more efficient
than the schemes in [24], [26]. Unfortunately, it was proved
to be insecure in the case of Type II adversary in [32]. To
address the above issues, we propose an improved CL-AS for
our batch verification scheme.
Batch Verification
...
Registration
Data Stream
IoV
Data Center
Key Generation Center
RSU
Aggregate Signature
Fig. 2: The network architecture of MDBV
III. PRELIMINARIES
To better understand our scheme, we introduce some pre-
liminaries about the properties of bilinear pairings and the
security model of MDBV.
A. Bilinear Pairings
Definition 1. Bilinear Pairings: G1 and G2 are two groups
with same prime order q. We utilizes a bilinear pairing e : G1×
G1 → G2 to indicate the relation of two groups, and it has
the following properties:
• Bilinearity: We have e(aP, bQ) = e(P,Q)ab, where P ,
Q ∈ G1, random number a, b ∈ Z
∗
q ;
• Non-degeneracy: There exists P , Q ∈ G1, such that
e(P,Q) 6= 1;
• Computability: There is an efficient algorithm to compute
e(P,Q) for any P , Q ∈ G1.
Definition 2. Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) Problem:
Given P, aP, bP ∈ G1 for any a, b ∈ Z
∗
q , output abP .
B. Security Model of MDBV
According to the definition in [33], adversaries are divided
into three types: normal, strong, and super adversaries based
on the different abilities of accessing signature oracles. The
normal attacker is able to replace the public key of target
user without obtaining his/her signature. The strong adversary
can not obtain the target signer’s signature unless a challenger
knows the secret value associated with a replaced public
key. The super adversary can also obtain the target user’s
signature even if the challenger doesn’t know the secret value.
Obviously, the super adversary has the strongest attack power.
Thus, we assume there are two types of super adversaries in
the proposed scheme: AI and AII . AI is able to replace any
user’s public key and get valid message signature pairs, while
AII can replace any user’s public key except the target user.
Here, we utilize the security model in [33] to prove the security
of MDBV. Our scheme is proved to be secure against AI and
AII .
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TABLE I: Notations
Notations Description
KGC A key generation center
n The number of vehicles
IDi The identity of vehicle i
∆ The state information
P A generator in cyclic group
q The order of cyclic group
(G1,+) A cyclic additive group
(G2, ·) A cyclic multiplicative group
e A bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2
H1(·) A Map-To-Point hash function
h2(·) A secure hash function
(P0, Param) The KGC’s public key and system parameters
s The KGC’s master secret key
(Pi, 〈xi, Di〉) The public key and private key of vehicle i
〈R, V 〉 The aggregated signature
IV. AN EFFICIENT MONITORING DATA BATCH
VERIFICATION FOR SURVIVABILITY OF INTERNET OF
VEHICLES
Vehicles can gather a large number of monitoring data from
their own sensors, other vehicles, infrastructure and so on, then
they uploads the data to IoV data center. Therefore, when the
number of vehicles is increasing, it has been a key challenge
for IoV to make sure the timeliness and validity of the massive
sensing data. So, we design an efficient monitoring data batch
verification scheme for the survivability of IoV. To facilitate
understanding, the relevant notations are listed in Table I.
A. Design Objectives
With the increasing of vehicles, the burden of authentication
becomes heavier. To address this problem, we propose an effi-
cient method for verifying masses of data in IoV. It can provide
batch verification of monitoring data based on an improved
certificateless aggregate scheme. The network architecture of
MDBV is shown in Fig. 2, which contains Key Generation
Center (KGC), vehicles, road-side units and IoV data center.
The KGC is responsible for generating the cryptographic keys
of all entities in IoV.
B. Monitoring Data Batch Verification Scheme
Our scheme mainly consists of five algorithms: System
Setup, Registration, Individual Monitoring Data Signing, Ag-
gregation, and Batch Verification. A state information ∆ with
random length is introduced to improve security. When a
vehicle enters a new area, it chooses the appropriate ∆ and
broadcasts it. The following is the detailed steps:
1) System Setup: KGC performs the following steps to
initialize the system:
– Given the security parameter l, KGC creates a cyclic
additive group G1 and a cyclic multiplicative group
G2 with prime order q(q > 2
l), and generates a
bilinear map e : G1 ×G1 → G2.
– KGC selects a random s ∈ Z∗q as the system master
key, and keeps s in secret. Next, it computes its
public key P0 = sP .
– KGC chooses two hash functions H1 : {0, 1}
∗ →
G1, h2 : {0, 1}
∗ → Z∗q . Finally, KGC
publishes the system parameters Param =
{G1, G2, e, q, P, P0,H1, h2}.
2) Registration: Upon receiving a registration request from
a vehicle i, KGC calculates Qi = H1(IDi) and sets
Di = sQi the partial private key for the vehicle. Then, the
vehicle picks randomly a number xi ∈ Z
∗
q , and calculates
Pi = xiP , then sets xi and Pi as its secret value and
public key, respectively. 〈xi, Di〉 is its whole private key.
Finally, KGC returns 〈IDi, Qi, Pi〉 to IoV data center via
a secure channel.
3) Individual Monitoring Data Signing: Before uploading
the collected monitoring data to RSU, vehicles can pre-
process the data and filter irrelevant information to re-
duce the network traffic. Then, based on the common
state information ∆, vehicle i with identity IDi signs a
requested monitoring datai using its private key 〈xi, Di〉
as follows:
– Choose a number ri ∈ Z
∗
q at random and calculate
Ri = riP , hi = h2(datai ‖ ∆ ‖ IDi), gi =
h2(datai ‖ ∆ ‖ Pi);
– Compute Vi = giDi + (xihi + ri)U . Here, U =
H1(∆ ‖ P0);
– Send 〈datai, σi〉 to RSU. Here, σi = (Ri, Vi) is the
individual verification information on datai.
4) Aggregation: Upon receiving a large number of data
with individual verification information, RSU converges
a collection of messages with the same state infor-
mation ∆. For n vehicles with identities LID =
{ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn}, the public keys are LPK =
{P1, P2, . . . , Pn} and the corresponding data-signature
pairs are 〈data1, σ1〉, 〈data2, σ2〉, . . . , 〈datan, σn〉, re-
spectively. RSU computes R = R1 + R2 + . . . + Rn,
V = V1 + V2 + . . . + Vn and sets σ = 〈R, V 〉 as the
aggregated signature. Eventually, RSU forwards all data
with the single verifiable signature to the data center.
5) Batch Verification: To check the validity of the final
signature σ on uploaded monitoring data, the IoV data
center does as follows:
– Calculate U = H1(∆ ‖ P0);
– Calculate Qi = H1(IDi), hi = h2(datai ‖ ∆ ‖
IDi), gi = h2(datai ‖ ∆ ‖ Pi) for all 1 6 i 6 n,;
– Verify the equation e(V, P ) =
e(
∑n
i=1 giQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi + R,U). If it
holds, the uploaded data is valid. Otherwise, the
data center refuses to accept these data.
Fig. 3 indicates the flowchart of MDBV.
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C. Correctness
The correctness of MDBV is proved as follows:
For individual verification: We can verify the individual data
via the following equation:
e(Vi, P ) = e(giDi + (xihi + ri)U, P )
= e(giQi, P0)e((xihi + ri)P,U)
= e(giQi, P0)e(xihiP + riP,U)
= e(giQi, P0)e(hiPi +Ri, U)
For batch verification: From above, we have the following
equation:
e(V, P ) = e(
n∑
i=1
Vi, P )
= e(
n∑
i=1
(giDi + (xihi + ri)U), P )
= e(
n∑
i=1
giDi, P )e(
n∑
i=1
(xihi + ri)U, P )
= e(
n∑
i=1
giQi, P0)e(
n∑
i=1
(hiPi +Ri), U)
= e(
n∑
i=1
giQi, P0)e(
n∑
i=1
hiPi +R,U)
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
The security analysis of MDBV is given in this section,
including security proof and security property.
A. Security Proof
To prove the existential unforgeability of MDBV, we intro-
duce two types of super adversaries AI and AII to play the
games with a challenger respectively.
Theorem 1. MDBV is existential unforgeable against the
adversaries AI in ROM assuming the hardness of CDHP.
Proof: C is a challenger try to solve a random CDH instance
(P, aP, bP ). Adversary AI can help C achieve this goal in the
following games.
Setup: C sets P0 = aP and Param =
{G1, G2, e, q, P, P0,H1, h2}, and returns Param to AI .
Simulation: H1 and h2 are two hash functions. Meanwhile,
C keeps two lists LH1 and Lh2 . AI can adaptively perform the
following queries.
1) Register-query: C first randomly chooses
j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, then AI makes Register-query
on an identity IDi. If i 6= j, C picks xi, yi ∈ Z
∗
q at
random, where the tuple 〈IDi, Qi, Pi, Di, xi, yi〉 is not
in LR, and computes Qi = yiP , Pi = xiP , Di = yiP0;
Otherwise, C randomly chooses Qj = bP ∈ G1,
xj ∈ Z
∗
q , and sets Dj = “unknown”, Pj = xjP . Then,
C inserts 〈IDi, Qi, Pi, Di, xi, yi〉 to LR and returns Qi
and Pi as the answer.
2) Partial-Private-Key-query: AI makes a query on an iden-
tity IDi. When i 6= j, C scans LR, and responds Di to
AI . Otherwise, C aborts.
3) Public-Key-Replace-query: AI asks a question on
〈IDi, P
′
i 〉, C scans LR, replacing 〈Pi, xi, yi〉 with
〈P ′i , “unknown”, yi〉.
4) Secret-Value-query: AI asks a question on an identity
IDi. C first searches LR, if xi 6= “unknown”, it sends
xi to AI ; Otherwise, it sends “unknown”.
5) H1-query: AI can make a query on 〈∆i, P0〉. If the tuple
〈∆i, Ui, λi〉 is not in LH1 , C chooses λi ∈ Z
∗
q . Then,
it sets Ui = λiP − P0, and sends it to AI . Finally,
〈∆i, Ui, λi〉 will be added to LH1 .
6) h2-query: AI asks a question on any (0, 1)
∗. If Lh2 con-
tains tuples 〈datai,∆i, IDi, hi〉 or 〈datai,∆i, Pi, gi〉, C
chooses hi or gi ∈ Z
∗
q . Then, it returns hi or gi to AI
and inserts the tuple to Lh2 .
7) Individual-Signing-query: AI makes a signing query on
any 〈datai,∆i, IDi, Pi〉, C does as follows:
(a) Select ri, hi, gi ∈ Z
∗
q randomly, while hi and gi are
not in Lh2 .
(b) Compute Ri = riP + giQi − hiPi.
(c) Search Ui = λiP − P0 in LH1 and compute Vi =
λigiQi + riλiP − riP0.
C stores the above information in the relevant lists and
sends 〈Ri, Vi〉 to AI . 〈Ri, Vi〉 is valid, since
e(giQi, P0)e(hiPi +Ri, Ui)
= e(giQi, P0)e(riP + giQi, λiP − P0)
= e(λiriP + λigiQi, P )e(riP,−P0)
= e(λigiQi + riλiP − riP0, P )
= e(Vi, P )
8) Forgery: Finally, AI returns n vehicles, whose identities
are LID = {ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn} and corresponding
public keys are LPK = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}, n monitoring
data 〈data1, data2, . . . , datan〉, a same state information
∆, and a forged aggregate signature σ. Moreover, the
aggregate signature must satisfy the following conditions:
(a) e(V, P ) = e(
∑n
i=1 giQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi +R,U).
(b) There exists at least an identity IDk ∈ LID has
not made Partial-Private-Key-query and Individual-
Signing-query on 〈datak,∆, IDk, Pk〉.
According to Forking lemma [34], AI can forge a new
signature σ′ = 〈R, V ′〉 through replaying technology
with the same random tape but a different response to
h2. In this process, if i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}\{k}, gi = g
′
i;
otherwise, gk 6= g
′
k. Hence, we have the following
equations:{
e(V, P ) = e(
∑n
i=1 giQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi +R,U)
e(V ′, P ) = e(
∑n
i=1 g
′
iQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi +R,U)
If IDk = IDj , meaning Qk = Qj = bP , C calculates
abP = (gj−g
′
j)
−1(V −V ′) and sets abP as the solution
of CDHP; otherwise, it aborts.
Through the analysis on the attack of adversary AI , we can
also deduce Theorem 2 in the similar way.
Theorem 2. MDBV is existentially unforgeable against the
adversaries AII in ROM assuming the intractability of CDHP.
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Fig. 3: The flowchart of MDBV
Proof: C plays the same role as in Theorem 1. Adversary AII
can help C to solve the CDH problem.
Setup: C randomly selects a number s ∈ Z∗q as the system
secret key and calculates its public key P0 = sP . Then, it
sends Param = {G1, G2, e, q, P, P0,H1, h2} ∪ {s} to AII .
Simulation: AII can adaptively question all the following
queries except Partial-Private-Key-query. C holds two lists LH1
and Lh2 .
1) Register-query: C first randomly picks j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
then AII can make a Register-query on an identity IDi.
C picks xi, yi ∈ Z
∗
q at random, where yi does not exist
in LR. If i 6= j, C calculates Qi = yiP , Pi = xiP ;
otherwise, C computes Qj = yjP , and sets Pj = xjbP .
Then, C inserts the tuple 〈IDi, Qi, Pi, Di, xi, yi〉 to LR
and returns Qi and Pi as answer.
2) Public-Key-Replace-query: AII makes a query on
〈IDi, P
′
i 〉, then C checks it in LR and does as follows:
(a) If i 6= j, C performs a public key re-
placement. Namely, C replaces 〈Pi, xi, yi〉 with
〈P ′i , “unknown”, yi〉;
(b) If i = j, C aborts.
3) Secret-Value-query: AII can query on any IDi. Then, C
checks it in LR and does as follows:
(a) If i 6= j and xi 6= “unknown”, C returns xi to AII .
Otherwise, it outputs “unknown”;
(b) If i = j, C aborts.
4) H1-query: AII can ask a question on 〈∆i, P0〉. C chooses
λi ∈ Z
∗
q . Next, it computes Ui = λiP − aP , and sends it
to AII . Finally, 〈∆i, Ui, λi〉 will be inserted to LH1 .
5) h2-query: AII queries on an identity IDi, C picks hi
or gi ∈ Z
∗
q . Then, it sends hi or gi to AII and inserts
〈datai,∆i, IDi, hi〉 or 〈datai,∆i, Pi, gi〉 to Lh2 .
6) Individual-Signing-query: AII makes a signing query on
any 〈datai,∆i, IDi, Pi〉, C does as follows:
(a) Select ri, hi, gi ∈ Z
∗
q randomly, while hi and gi are
not in Lh2 .
(b) Compute Ri = riP − hiPi.
(c) Search Ui = λiP − aP in LH1 and compute Vi =
sgiQi + riλiP − riaP .
C stores the above information to the relevant lists and
sends 〈Ri, Vi〉 to AII . According to the equation P0 =
sP and the individual signing verification algorithm, we
can check if 〈Ri, Vi〉 is valid, since
e(giQi, P0)e(hiPi +Ri, Ui)
= e(giQi, sP )e(hiPi +Ri, λiP − P0)
= e(sgiQi, P )e(riP, λiP − P0)
= e(sgiQi, P )e(ri(λiP − P0), P )
= e(sgiQi, P )e(riλiP − riP0, P )
= e(sgiQi + riλiP − riP0, P )
= e(Vi, P )
7) Forgery: Finally, AI returns n vehicles, whose identities
are LID = {ID1, ID2, . . . , IDn} and corresponding
public keys are LPK = {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}, n monitoring
data 〈data1, data2, . . . , datan〉, a same ∆, and a forged
σ = (R, V ) that satisfies the following cases:
(a) e(V, P ) = e(
∑n
i=1 giQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi +R,U).
(b) There is at least an identity IDk ∈ LID,
which has not made Individual-Signing-query on
〈datak,∆, IDk, Pk〉.
Here, according to Forking lemma, AI can forge a new
signature σ′ = 〈R, V ′〉 using replaying technology. In
this process, if i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}\{k}, hi = h
′
i; otherwise,
hk 6= h
′
k. Hence, we have the following equations:{
e(V, P ) = e(
∑n
i=1 giQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 hiPi +R,U)
e(V ′, P ) = e(
∑n
i=1 giQi, P0)e(
∑n
i=1 h
′
iPi +R,U)
Then the below equation is obtained.
e((hj − h
′
j)Pj , P ) = e(V − V
′, P )
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If IDk = IDj , then Ui = λiP − aP and Pk = Pj =
xjbP . C could solve the CDHP by computing abP =
λixjP +λibP −axjP − (V −V
′)(hj −h
′
j)
−1 according
to the above equation. Otherwise, it aborts.
B. Security Property
We have the security property comparison of our scheme
with the existing schemes [24], [26], [27], [28], [29], [35], [36]
in this part. As shown in Table II, the schemes in [29], [35] can
only resist the normal adversaryAI andAII , and their security
is weak. Also, the schemes [24]-1 and [24]-2 have weak
security property though they have the resistance to the strong
adversary AI and the normal adversary AII . Meanwhile,
although the resistance to the first type of adversary AI is
stronger in [26], [36], both of them can’t resist the second
normal adversary (AII ). Moreover, the scheme in [27] can
resist the super adversary AI but it is not strong enough to
resist the second super adversary (AII ). From Theorem 1
and Theorem 2, MDBV can resist both two types of super
adversaries AI and AII , it achieves better security property
compared with other schemes.
VI. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we compare MDBV with several existing
schemes [26], [28], [29], [30] in terms of performance evalu-
ation. The details are as follows:
A. Computation Overhead
We set up a simulation environment to evaluate the com-
putation costs. Firstly, we test the performance in terms of
computation and then closely compare MDBV with its non-
aggregate mode, named un-Agg mode, and other four schemes.
In un-Agg mode, all data is verified by RSU one by one. Then,
we analyze the computation efficiency of all schemes.
Table III shows the computation complexity among the
selected schemes. Let “P ” denote the bilinear pairing in G1,
“M” denote multiplication in G1, “H” denote the Map-To-
Point operation, and “L” denote the length of the elements
in G1. From Table III, MDBV only involves three “M” and
one “H” in the individual signing stage, and requires less
computation complexity than the other schemes in the phase
of batch verification. Moreover, we find that all except for the
scheme in [28] have the fixed length of the batch verification
signature—2L. We will describe the trend of computation
overheads with the number of vehicles in the following part.
1) Platform setup: In order to measure the computation
overhead of the selected schemes, we set Raspberry Pi 3B+ as
the hardware environment that runs Raspbian GNU/Linux 8.0
(jessie) over Broadcom BCM2837 64 Bit ARMv7 Quad Core
1.2GHz Processor with 1GB 400MHz SDRAM. The simula-
tion is implemented based on the GNU Multiple Precision
Arithmetic (GMP) library and Pairing Based Cryptography
(PBC) library. The elliptic curve is y2 = x3 +x, in which the
pairing operation is symmetric and the embedding degree k is
2. We run each scheme 1000 times to eliminate the randomness
of the results.
2) Simulation results and analysis: There are three brief
kinds of cryptographic operations causing major computation
overhead in these schemes: “M”, “P ”, and “H” operations.
Table IV shows that the time consumption of the three basic
cryptographic operations. The time consumption on individual
data signing is shown in Table V.
We can easily calculate the time consumption of the
“Individual monitoring data signing” stage and the “Batch
verification” stage based on the running time of the three
basic cryptographic operations. Fig. 4(a) shows that MDBV
takes less computation overhead with the increasing number
of vehicles than the other schemes [26], [28], [29], [30] in the
individual data signing stage. And, it also requires less time
overhead on batch verification than the other four selected
schemes from Fig. 4(b). Meanwhile, the efficiency of batch
verification in MDBV is much higher than that in un-Agg
mode.
B. Communication Overhead
To evaluate the communication overhead, we mainly ana-
lyze the message size in the communication process between
RSU and IoV data center.
A point P on an elliptic curve is represented by coordinates
(x, y) over a finite field Fp. Once a coordinate x or y is given,
the point P = (x, y) on a specific elliptic curve, such as
y2 = x3 + x, can be easily constructed. Thus, when a vehicle
tries to send a point P = (x, y), it only needs to transmit
the single coordinate x or y to reduce the communication
overhead. Meanwhile, because the group order q is 160 bits
long and the order of the base field p is 512 bits long over the
elliptic curve, the length of point P is 512 bits or 64 bytes.
In MDBV, the signature σi = (Ri, Vi) of vehicle i consists
of two points on the elliptic curve. We use S to denote
the length of datai. And, we utilize a similar approach in
[37], [38], [39] to calculate the message size of MDBV,
assuming that S is 160 bits. So, in MDBV, the total com-
munication overhead for a signed data is 148 bytes, as
|Ri| + |Vi| + |datai| = 64 + 64 + 20 bytes. If we adopt
other supersingular elliptic curves, like the scheme in [40], the
total communication overhead will be reduced to 60 bytes, as
|Ri|+ |Vi|+ |datai| = 20 + 20 + 20 bytes.
On account that all schemes have the same traffic be-
tween vehicles and RSU, we mainly analyze the communi-
cation overhead between RSU and IoV data center. Fig. 6(a)
shows the comparison on communication overhead in different
schemes. Among these schemes, MDBV has a fixed length
of 2L (a constant) for data verification, as shown in Table
III. Therefore, the length of authentication message in ZQWZ
[26], DHW [29], CTMHH [30] and MDBV is 2L+ n× S. It
is far shorter than that of CWZY[28] and un-Agg mode.
C. Energy Cost
In this subsection, we connect a kind of mote with Rasp-
berry Pi 3B+ via USB interface to simulate the communication
between RSU and the data center, as shown in Fig. 5, which
is built upon an 8-bit ATmega128L processor with a Chip-
con CC2420 radio transceiver. To evaluate the total energy
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TABLE II: Security property comparisons between different schemes
Schemes GLHC[24]-1 GLHC[24]-2 ZQWZ[26] XGCL[27] CWZY[28] DHW[29] LYX[35] YZW[36] MDBV
Adversary AI
Normal
√ √
Strong
√ √
Super
√ √ √ √ √
Security Property weak weak strong strong strong weak strong strong strong
Adversary AII
Normal
√ √ √ √ √ √
Strong
Super
√ √ √
Security Property weak weak weak weak strong weak weak weak strong
TABLE III: Comparisons among six schemes
Schemes Signing Batch verification Length
ZQWZ[26] 5M + 3H 5P + 2nM + (2n + 3)H 2L
CWZY[28] 4M + 2H 4P + 2nM + (n+ 2)H (n+ 1)L
DHW[29] 4M + 2H 4P + 2nM + (n+ 2)H 2L
CTMHH[30] 4M + 2H 4P + 2nM + 2nH 2L
un-Agg mode 3M + 1H 3nP + 2nM + 2nH 2nL
MDBV 3M + 1H 3P + 2nM + (n+ 1)H 2L
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Fig. 4: Time consumption comparisons between different schemes
TABLE IV: Running time of basic operations
Operations Multiplication Map-To-Point Pairing
Time(ms) 10.087 23.417 15.063
overhead, we calculate the computation energy overhead on
Raspberry Pi 3B+ and the communication energy overhead
on the mote. By deploying asynchronous counters, we can
record the start and end time for the corresponding operation
with the precision of 1 millisecond.
Meanwhile, according to the method in [41], we record the
size of a message to transmit or receive on the mote. Then,
TABLE V: Time consumption on individual data signing
Schemes Time consumption (ms)
ZQWZ[26] 122.529
CWZY[28] 88.571
DHW[29] 87.664
CTMHH[30] 88.978
MDBV 54.324
we transfer it into the communication energy consumption via
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TABLE VI: Mote parameter settings
Mode Current consumption (mA)
Transmitting 17.4
Receiving 19.7
Fig. 5: The energy testing platform
the equation: Wr = V ∗ I ∗ bupslopedr, as shown in Table VI.
Here, “Wr” represents the energy magnitude, “V ” represents
the power level of the mote, “I” represents the current mode
of the mote, and “b” represents the size of a message (in bits),
“dr” represents the the data rate. Moreover, the data rate is
250 kbps, and we assume the power level of the mote is 3.0V.
In addition, we can compute the computation energy overhead
through the equation: W = V ∗ I ∗ t. Here, “W ” represents
the energy magnitude, “V ” represents the power level of the
Raspberry Pi 3B+, “I” represents the current of the Raspberry
Pi 3B+, and “t” represents the time of an operation. Here, we
assume that the power level of the Raspberry Pi 3B+ is 5.0V,
the current is 1.0A. Then, we obtain the computation energy
overhead. Eventually, we analyze the total energy overheads
of MDBV as follows:
1) RSU:
• Energy cost on computation: RSU only make simple
aggregation operations, so its energy cost can be ignored;
• Energy cost on communication: According to [42], we
used a packet size of 41 bytes, 32 bytes for the payload
and 9 bytes for the header. The header, ensuing a 8-byte
preamble, consists of source, destination, length, packet
ID, CRC, and a control byte. Thus, we can calculate the
RSU’s communication consumption for data transmission
on the mote as Wr = 3× 17.4× (41× 4+ 20+ 9+ 5×
8)× 8/250000 = 0.3892032mJ ;
• Total energy cost: The total energy overhead for each
member node on the mote is 0.3892032mJ .
2) Data Center:
• Energy cost on computation: The time of verifying a
message in MDBV is 113.375 ms, so it requires 5 ×
1× 113.375 = 566.875mJ ;
• Energy cost on communication: The data center receives
a message with the length of n × S + 2L from RSU.
Here, n denotes the number of vehicles, and we assume
S = L = 20 bytes. For simplification of comprehension,
we set n = 1 and n = 20 respectively, and then
calculate communication consumption (namely,Wrn) for
receiving message in side of data center, as follows:
Wr1 = 3×19.7×(41×4+20+9+5×8)×8/250000 =
0.4406496mJ , and Wr20 = 3× 19.7× (41× 16 + 16 +
9 + 8× 17)× 8/250000 = 1.5451104mJ ;
• Total energy cost: we set w = ⌊(20 × n + 128)upslope32⌋,
so the total energy of the data center on the mote is
566.875 + (41 × w + 20 × n + 137 − 32 × w + (w +
1)×8)×3×19.7/250000 = 0.0040188w+0.004728n+
566.909278mJ .
From the above results, the energy consumption on com-
munication in RSU and data center is both insignificant,
compared with the overhead on computation. So, the com-
putation complexity mainly determines the performance of
a scheme. Next, assuming |data| = 160 bits, we evaluate
the total energy overhead in these schemes, as shown in
Fig.6(b). Consequently, we find that MDBV minimizes energy
consumption and achieves the best performance among all the
selected schemes.
For all above, our scheme achieves quick data authentication
and strengthens the security and survivability of IoV. It is more
suitable for realistic IoV scenarios.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we design a CLAS-based monitoring data
batch verification scheme for IoV scenarios–MDBV that en-
hances the survivability and reduces the computation overhead
effectively. The scheme is proved to be secure in the random
oracle model under the hardness of CDHP. Furthermore,
MDBV has the fixed length of the aggregated authentication
message with the increasing number of vehicles. Each vehicle
can dynamically participate in the system using own informa-
tion and public system parameter. Moreover, the performance
evaluation shows that the computation overhead, communica-
tion overhead, and energy cost of the proposed scheme are
less than the other relevant schemes. MDBV is more suitable
for the survivability of IoV.
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